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Professor Otto Koenigsberger, the director of the Development Planning Unit
in London, has suggested that there are four categories of people with an interest
in disasters (see Chart 1, Appendix):
The fascinated public,
The socially conscious,
The reformer/innovator,
The architect/planner.
The recent crop of disaster films —  "Towering Inferno", "Earthquake" —  
are symptoms of the public’s appetite for disasters. However, public interest 
can rapidly wane in an actual situation. When Lice in Turkey was destroyed on 
September 6, 1975, it received headline coverage on September 8th, but by 
September 12th it had totally departed from all national newspapers in Britain.
In the second category, there are the relief workers, or the public who 
subscribe to them.
The reformer seeks to capitalize on a disaster since it presents unique 
opportunities for urban reform. Christopher Wren unsuccessfully attempted to 
re-plan the city of London in the aftermath of the great fire, whilst in Lisbon 
following the earthquake of 1755, the city was given its new grid-iron urban 
center.
The fourth category is the architect and planner. The reasons for the 
architect’s interest in emergency housing are significant and I will return to 
these. However, at this point we should note that the role of the architect 
relative to a disaster falls into three roles, in three fairly closely related 
time situations:
a) Pre-disaster planning, or mitigation with contingency planning;
b) Relief provision of shelter (Impact up to about three weeks);
c) Recons true tion (From about three weeks onwards).
The focus of most architects’ (and certainly architectural students') concern is 
with (b), Relief provision, and to a certain extent it can be argued that this 
is a blinkered concern. Although this is a significant stage, it is probably 
true to say that the most vital stage for the allocation of resources and research 
effort is (a), Pre-disaster planning. This is not the subject I have been asked 
to speak on, but I would like to emphasize this priority.
Fred Krimgold, an American architect who trained in London but now lives in 
Sweden, writes:^-
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"What can architects do about disasters? The first, most obvious area 
of concentration was on emergency shelter design. In studying the actual 
rehabilitation and permanent reconstruction phases it became evident that 
the problem of temporary shelter was subordinate to that of reconstruction. 
However, with further study it became apparent that the investment of 
effort and resources which gives the greatest return in both economic and 
• human terms must be made in the pre-disaster phase. In the pre-disaster 
phase the skills of architects and planners are also of great importance. 
Plans must be developed to reduce disaster impact. Areas of high risk 
must be avoided for human settlement. Building techniques must be devel­
oped which are based on local materials and able to withstand disaster 
force."
Reasons why mitigation is such a vital area relate to the tremendous threat 
of our fast growing cities. They are growing at a much faster rate than miti­
gation measures, which include better by-law controls, better constructional 
techniques, and advice on the location of housing in an area. For earthquake- 
prone areas, in relating building locations to seismic data; for flood-prone 
areas, to flood expectation levels; and for hurricanes relative to expectation 
of direction.
We now face a situation where many of our major cities are extremely vul­
nerable. To name a few: Kingston, Jamaica; Guatemala City; Managua, Nicaragua; 
Lima, Peru; Santiago, Chile; Dacca, Bangladesh. Recent devastation at Darwin 
has shown that the developed world is not in any way immune; and Tokyo, Anchorage 
and San Francisco are not the only major developed cities that are at risk.
Recently there has been an extensive study of San Francisco, and attempts 
have been made to predict the consequences of an earthquake of similar intensity 
to the one of 1906 which destroyed the city.
Comparisons have been made by Professor Robert W. Kates of Clark University, 
Worcester, Mass., in a recent research project on reconstruction following 
disaster.^
Earthquake of 
1906
Estimated Consequences 
of earthquake in near 
future
Scale of Earthquake 8.3 (Richter) 8.3 (Richter)
Population: 400,000 3,100,000 (overall 
conurbation)
Deaths: 500 8,750 (22,000 injured)
Homeless: 220,000 500,000
Damage: Entire commercial 
and industrial center 
destroyed. 55% of 
all housing units 
destroyed.
100,000 homes unusable
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The scale of damage in disasters is often overlooked. It can be such that 
it may take up to 15-20 years for a place to recover. In Skopje, the earthquake 
was in 1963 and the total rebuilding will probably continue for about 4 years 
before the city will claim to have recovered - an elapsed period of sixteen 
years. In Managua, it may well take much longer.
In terms of the cost of damage, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organi­
zation (UNDRO) are at present completing a detailed study with the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to try to ascertain the full value of damage after 
a disaster, relative to the G.N.P. of a given country.
In human terms the results are as to be expected. The U.S. Department of 
State estimated that between July 1st, 1970, and June 30th, 1971, over fifty- 
one disasters took place (none of which was man-made). These disasters affected 
sixty-eight million people and caused half a million deaths.
If earthquakes alone are considered, it has been estimated by Professor 
Ambraseys of Imperial College^ that over 800,000 people have died since 1900, 
an average of about 14,000 per annum.
Therefore, it is encouraging that pre-disaster planning is proceeding very 
extensively throughout the world; but since there are few vested commercial 
interests, it is mostly being sponsored by governmental or academic institutions.
The other, possibly neglected area of concern is the (c) stage, Reconstruc­
tion. Another word for this is simply "low-cost housing".
In Britain there are 20,000 registered architects for a population of 
fifty-five million —  one architect for every 2,750 people.
In the U.S.A. there are 60,000 registered architects for a population of 
209,000,000 —  one architect per every 3,500 people.
There is a very real need for architects to concern themselves with the 
needs of the underprivileged, the poor, the mentally ill, the elderly —  and 
within this category we have the problems of reconstruction, in what might be 
described as a continual disaster situation. Buckminster Fuller made the remark 
in one of his epic six-hour lectures, "As an architect you have to make a decision, 
do you want to make money or make sense." This is not to say that they are 
incompatible aims; but we all know of architects wasting their energies on useless 
buildings that society may have little need of. So this is a small cry to con­
sider third world problems as a focus of your careers.
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Now to return to the issue why the architect has this acute interest in 
disasters, as a colleague put it: "surely this is a rather unhealthy pre­
occupation!" The reasons are fairly obvious, since an opportunity is apparently 
offered which coalesces no less than six perennial concerns of most architects, 
particularly during their student careers (see Chart 1, Appendix). These are 
escapism; a social concern; an interest in geometry; a desire for innovation; an 
interest in the mobile, temporary form of dwelling; and finally, the very 
obvious opportunity for work following the collapse of a great many buildings.
It is perhaps useful to look at these pre-occupations since they are at the 
root of the situation which causes the continual flood of emergency shelter 
ideas that bombard the various relief agencies.
On the issue of escapism, it is interesting that most designs for emergency 
shelter emanate from countries far away from areas of high risk. Disasters are 
mercifully rare in Britain, and this remoteness heightens their fascination for 
the designer.
The social concern is, of course, praiseworthy, but it can have patronizing 
elements within it —  a concern of what good "we" can do for "them".
"Close packing truncated cuboctohedrons" is a technical description of a 
series of inter-related volumes. They find few outlets in conventional archi­
tecture and the disaster shelter is apparently an obvious application for clever 
geometrical configurations.
The basic concern of every architect is to innovate by developing new forms 
and using new technologies.
The interest in mobility is more complex, and probably relates to various 
aesthetic movements in the 1960's. The emphasis here is "drop the shelter"
(perhaps by parachute) to "move it", "float it", or "pump it up". All of these 
techniques being used in various designs of the past decade. Perhaps the love 
of the "temporary" has its roots in the boy scout summer camp!
Finally, the very obvious fact that disasters offer opportunities for work 
for both designers and contractors. A friend of mine, an English architect, 
was working in the States in the early 1960's when a tornado wiped out a town.
Like many others, he was unemployed at the time and decided to visit the town 
in question in the hope of picking up some work. He got off the train and as he 
walked down the platform saw a lot of other men with large tee-squares projecting 
from their briefcases (rather like vultures descending for what they could collect).
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To return to the ingenious designs that get produced every year —  what 
actually happens to them. One answer is that they bulge out of the filing cabinets 
of virtually every relief agency in the world; but despite this, very few of these 
designs have actually been used in a disaster situation. Two systems that have 
been used are: first, the West German Red Cross Bayer Polyurethane igloo —  used 
initially in Peru, Turkey and Nicaragua^; and second, the continuing experimentation 
by OXFAM into polyurethane igloos and more recently hexagonal polyurethane igloos 
that have been field-tested in Bangladesh^. These units will have their first 
field use in Lice, Turkey. This urgent provision is an attempt to meet the 
exposure problem of homeless people as the winter of 1975 advances. In fact, 
next week, forty-five days after the earthquake, they will be used. Note that 
date, forty-five days after the earthquake.
So we have seen why architects have a concern; the next question is again 
reasonably obvious, why do contractors have a concern?
Firstly and unashamedly to make money. They assume that there is a lot of 
profit in them. They also may (like Bayer Chemicals of W. Germany, and OXFAM 
in England) go into the venture with a view to getting very good publicity —  
and the more novel the building shape or erection process, the more attention 
from the media. Finally, contractors may go into this sphere like anyone else 
for humanitarian reasons, a genuine concern for the homeless.
Why then, if there is pressure from the designers to implement the shelters 
and pressure from industry, are so very few used? Perhaps the answer is an 
amalgam of these factors:
a) They often cost a great deal. Mr. Dalton, Acting Chief of Disaster 
Relief with A.I.D. in Washington, told me that in his rule of 
thumb, they must end up costing about the same as a good tent.
That is to say under $300.
b) A suspicion of them by both affected countries and donor groups, 
relief agencies and their staff.
What are the reasons for their suspicion? Here are some possible ones, I 
might suggest, a purely personal choice of factors. The problem of cultural 
acceptance of a standard house type, by varying societies; the time it takes to 
transport and erect such systems; the mistaken idea of "temporary housing" (our 
World War I pre-fabs are still in use); and the need for a society to use its 
unemployed men to reconstruct in accustomed ways as a moral and economic boost.
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But perhaps at a fundamental level it highlights the mistaken idea in our society, 
that the distinction we draw between the temporary and permanent is similar to 
rural society in say Turkey or Latin America. We all know the difference between 
our symbol of permanence, the surburban "semi-d" and the wooden beach house or 
holiday hut. Perhaps subconsciously it is assumed that similar distinctions 
exist elsewhere. In actual fact, most "permanent” housing in many Third World 
situations (which admirably meets the occupants' needs) is probably by our 
definition "temporary" (see Charts 2 and 3).
Perhaps I can now turn to the two places where I have a little knowledge, 
Skopje in Yugoslavia and Managua in Nicaragua. I will first show a few slides 
of each and then make some comparisons relative to the provision of shelter (see 
Chart 4).
The salient points of the comparison are that we are comparing two situations 
with two basic points of contrast:
1) In a socialist republic with a totally different land policy and 
social and administrative organization to the other, which is of course 
a capitalist situation;
2) One has a disaster in a fairly developed situation, whereas Managua is 
in a developing country;
and basic points of similarity:
3) Similar size;
4) Both regional capitals;
5) Both virtually to be rebuilt;
6) Both maximum aid situations.
At this point slides were shown.
It is the emphasis of my own research that it is possible to rebuild permanent 
as opposed to temporary houses in these large urban areas rapidly if at all possi­
ble by the occupants using their normal vernacular style. Where this is unsafe, 
they may need to modify the design. The classic example of rapid rebuilding of 
homes after a disaster is Skopje where 14,000 pre-fabricated homes were built in 
a period of eight months^. One further vital issue is for countries to rebuild 
all schools, churches, all public buildings so that there is no likelihood of 
their being destroyed in any future disaster. They can then form temporary 
shelters, dispensaries, morgues and food distribution centers if and when a future 
disaster strikes. This is, however, merely a by-product of ensuring that all 
public buildings housing large numbers of people are totally safe. In Managua,
900 schools and four hospitals collapsed in the disaster.
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Despite helpful medicine, "prevention is always better than cure" in the 
housing sector of all vulnerable settlements. It is the hopeful expectation of 
many that within the coming decade, the vulnerable villages, towns and cities 
of our world will be able to apply simple preventative "medicine" in the design 
and siting of homes, and that these measures will mitigate the future ravages 
of nature.
/
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APPENDIX
CHART 1
Groups with Interests in Disasters
1. (The public
2. (The socially conscious
3. (The reformer/innovator
4. (The architect/planner ..
CHART 2
Housing/Shelter Criteria
Post
Disaster
Period
Housing
Type
Housing
Goals
Desirable
Delivery/
Erection
Time
Minimum
Utility
Require­
ments
Site
Require­
ments
Approx. 
Period 
of use
Life
Sustaining Emergency
Group
Living 48 hours
Subsis­
tence
level
Any 
Avail.
10 days
Situation
Stabili­
zing
Temporary
Semi-
Family
Living
10 days CommunalRationed
Planned 
Temp. 6 wks.
Recovery Semi-
Permanent
Family
Living 6 wks.
Private
Rationed
Con­
version 1 year
Taken from Housing Technology Alternatives for use in planning post-disaster 
programmes, page 13, pub. by National Academy of Science, Washington, 1972.
(Escapism 
(Social Concern 
(Geometry
(Desire to Innovate
(Interest in Mobility/Temporary
(Desire for Work
CHART 3
Problems With Western Solutions to Shelter
1) Cost —  often too expensive (add freight costs);
2) Cultural Acceptance by differing societies;
3} Time - often too slow for use as emergency shelter;
4) Not Temporary;
5) Generate Little Local Economic Growth;
6 ) Climate Problems.
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CHART 4
MANAGUA SKOPJE
Date December 22, 1972 July 26, 1963
Pre-disaster
population 430,000 200,000
Present
population 500,000 approx. 420,000
Casualties dead 4,000 - 8,000 1,400
Population homeless 250,000 130,000
Houses - damaged
- destroyed
24.000
50.000
9,217
25,281
Evacuation Policy Cordon center 
distribute food 
in outlying areas
Compulsory for 
120,000
for three months
Damage to Property $300 million $1,400 million
Value of total aid $14.3 million $16.8 million
Value total 
reconstruction ? $39.2 million
Tents provided 4,191 14,044
Total used approx. 1,800 approx. 2,000
Types of emergency 
shelter, Year 1
wooden huts 
igloos 
tents
existing buildings
nissen huts 
tents
existing buildings
Types of permanent 
housing, 2
asbestos cement 
concrete block 
stack-sack
basic
housing complete 
by Year 1
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